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The Incorporation of Philanthropy: negotiating
Tensions Between Capitalism and Altruism in
Twentieth Century Canada
BETTInA LIvERAnT
Abstract
Exploring the intersection points of institutionalized philanthropy and the
Canadian corporation in periods of rising capital concentration, this paper
demonstrates how changes in business approaches to charitable donation mir-
ror larger transformations in corporate capitalism and organization, and the
subsequent migration of these structures and mentalities to the charitable sec-
tor. In the first phase, at the turn of the last century, philanthropic practices
came to be structured along corporate/professional models, with a new insis-
tence that charities be well managed, fiscally responsible, and scientific in
approach. In the postwar period, the expansion of corporate power was accom-
panied by the incorporation of philanthropic norms within capitalism. During
this period, the logic of investment intensified and became increasingly explicit.
Programs of donations were developed strategically for their potential to ben-
efit business as well as the community. Corporate philanthropy evolved from a
discretionary to an expected practice, offering visible testimony of business
commitment to social responsibility. 
Résumé
À travers l’étude du mécénat d’entreprise en période de concentration accrue
de capitaux, cet article montre comment la transformation de l’attitude des
milieux d’affaires face aux dons de bienfaisance reflète des transformations
plus vastes du capitalisme et de l’organisation des entreprises ainsi que la
migration ultérieure de ces structures et mentalités vers le secteur de la cha rité.
Au cours d’une première étape, au tournant du siècle dernier, les pratiques de
mécénat commencent à se structurer en fonction de modèles d’entreprise ou de
modèles professionnels, les attentes voulant dorénavant que les œuvres de bien-
faisance soient à la fois bien gérées, responsables sur le plan financier et
scienti fiquement rigoureuses. Après la guerre, l’adoption de normes philan-
thropiques au sein du capitalisme accompagne l’expansion du pouvoir des
entreprises. À cette époque, la logique de l’investissement s’intensifie et devient
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de plus en plus explicite. Des programmes de dons sont élaborés, de façon
stratégique, pour leur aptitude à bénéficier aux entreprises et à la collectivité.
De pratique discrétionnaire, le mécénat d’entreprise évolue dans le sens de la
pratique attendue, servant par le fait même de témoignage visible de l’engage-
ment du secteur des affaires à l’endroit de la responsabilité sociale.  
How is it that practices associated with the gift and the sacrifice, the possi-bility of honour in present and reward in the afterlife, became embedded
in business organizations? in postwar Canada, corporate giving has come to
play a major role in sustaining the non-profit sector, exerting influence dispro-
portionate to the amounts involved. Corporate donations are highly visible,
concentrated, and, because they are often regarded as a testimony to the wor-
thiness of receiving organizations, can initiate a chain of giving that directs
funds toward some causes to the neglect of others. 
Giving has become part of what corporations do; however, it is neither
obvious nor necessary for businesses to become involved in philanthropy.
indeed, objections to the philanthropic use of profits, rather than their reinvest-
ment in the company or distribution to shareholders continue to be raised.
Critics on the left perceive corporate giving as another means by which corpo-
rate power influences the social and political order. Critics on the right object
that “the business of business is business”: profits belong to shareholders and
are not managements’ to give. Social policy and cultural programming, both
sides contend, should be left to elected governments and individual agents. 
in spite of growing business and academic literature on corporate respon-
sibility and the non-profit sector, very few studies focus specifically on
corporate donations, particularly from a Canadian perspective. As Shirley
tillotson recently observed, the political priorities of welfare historians have
emphasized programs of income assistance and wealth redistribution rather
than the funding of social services.1 the “main story” has been the rise of the
state and the molding of citizens. the most thoughtful studies situate business
support for programs of social reform, as well as those for education and cul-
ture, in this context.2 Voluntary business giving, these scholars propose, may
appeal to the ideal of community solidarity, but depends upon inequalities 
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1 Shirley tillotson, Contributing Citizens: Modern Charitable Fundraising and the Making of
the Welfare State, 1920–66 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia press, 2008), 15. 
2 these include Jeffrey Brison, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Canada: American Philanthropy and
the Arts and Letters in Canada (Montréal and kingston: McGill-Queen’s University press,
2005); Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (toronto: James Lorimer,
1979), tillotson, Contributing Citizens; Shirley tillotson, “A new taxpayer for a new State:
Charitable Fundraising and the Origins of the Welfare State,” in The Welfare State in Canada:
Past, Present and Future, eds. p. Bryden R. Blake, and J. F. Strain (Concord: irwin, 1997); and
Mariana Valverde, The age of light, soap, and water: moral reform in English Canada,
1885–1925 (toronto: University of toronto press, 2008). 
in the distribution of wealth and power, and is embraced as a bulwark against
radical change. Canadian business historians, meanwhile, alternately celebrate
corporate giving as altruism or regard benevolence as a strategy to avoid union-
ization.3
American non-profit historian peter Dobkin Hall asserts that changes in
corporate giving practices should not be seen as evolutionary, but as sets of
activities that take specific form in time and place, shaped in response to exter-
nal constraints and opportunities (such as changes in tax law), as well as the
changing imperatives of managerial practice and the visions of leaders.4 By
exploring the intersection points of organized philanthropy and the Canadian
corporation in periods of rising capital concentration, this paper demonstrates
how changes in business approaches to charitable donation mirror larger trans-
formations in corporate capitalism and organization, and the subsequent
migration of these structures and mentalities to the charitable sector. 
in the first phase, at the turn of the last century, philanthropic practices
came to be structured along corporate/professional models, with a new insis-
tence that charities be well managed, fiscally responsible, and scientific in
approach. A second phase, after World War ii, saw philanthropic norms embed-
ded within corporate capitalism. Donations programs were brought into the
management structure with formal applications processes, administrative
mechanisms, selection criteria, and a set funding cycle. Methods of giving
broadened to include donations, sponsorships, gifts in kind, cause-related mar-
keting, and organized employee volunteerism. the logic of investment became
increasingly explicit, with programs strategically developed to contribute to
company profits or offset public relations problems. Corporate philanthropy
evolved from a discretionary to an expected practice, offering visible testimony
of business commitment to social responsibility. 
Stage One — incorporation: to give material form 
the transformation of Canada’s colonial economy at the turn of the last century
is a well known story. Seeking to expand production, control costs, reduce com-
petition, and steady prices, entrepreneurs invested in mechanization and
adopted new management techniques. Small proprietary firms began to restruc-
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3 See Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1987); H.M. Grant, “Solving the Labour problem at imperial Oil:
Welfare Capitalism in the Canadian petroleum industry, 1919–1929.” Labour/Le Travail 41
(1998); Margaret McCallum, “Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919–1939,” Canadian
Historical Review Lxxi, no. 1 (1990); Bruce Scott, “A place in the Sun: the industrial
Council at Massey-Harris, 1919–1929,” Labour/Le Travail 1 (1976). 
4 peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy,
Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations (Baltimore: John Hopkins University press, 1992),
13ff. 
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ture themselves into large, market-dominating corporations through a series of
expansions, mergers, and acquisitions. the pursuit of profit through the corpo-
rate form separated management from ownership, offering opportunities to
increase capitalization and manage risk. the corporate structure, which vested
responsibility in a hierarchy of offices rather than individual entrepreneurs,
promised to increase the stability and extend the reach of each enterprise. 
the shift from small-scale local and regionally oriented organizations to
large-scale, national and increasingly formal organizations took place across
the traditional boundaries of business, politics, and society. indeed American
economic historian Martin Sklar has urged us to see the rise of the corporation
as a social movement rather than simply a change in business strategy, involv-
ing the complete system of social relations and corresponding institutions. new
practices of philanthropy should be situated within these developments,
responding to the values and concerns of rising business elites, middle class
managers, and professionals whose interests were broadly aligned with the
development of new organizations and bureaucracies.5
Forms of giving vary with forms of wealth, and insofar as philanthropy
involves the giving of private wealth for public purposes, changes in the distri-
bution of economic power change philanthropic practice.6 the corporate
reconstruction of capital saturated all social forms; and the organization and
purposes of voluntary and benevolent associations were affected by changes in
economic organization no less than profit-oriented relationships. As a result,
corporate philanthropy exists in a “region of ambiguity.”7 Unresolved tensions
remain between understandings of business success as the just reward of per-
sonal character and moral choice, and those which associate excessive wealth
with questionable motives and unbridled appetites.8 Although changes in phil-
anthropy promised to reach across class rifts, as well as to forge a community
among contributors, the effort to ameliorate distress, although real, was delib-
erately incomplete.9 the function of philanthropy was not to correct
194
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5 this understanding draws upon Martin J. Sklar, The corporate reconstruction of American
capitalism, 1890–1916: the market, the law, and politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
press, 1988), and Alan trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: culture and society in the
gilded age (new york: Hill and Wang, 1982). 
6 On this theme, see Merle Curti, “the History of American philanthropy as a Field of
Research,” American Historical Review 62, no. 2 (January 1957): 354–5. 
7 trachtenberg, 80–1. 
8 For example, see John Reade, “Half a Century’s progress,” The Canadian Magazine xVi, no.
3 (January 1901): 324. 
9 Donileen Loseke, “‘the Whole Spirit of Modern philanthropy’: the Construction of the idea
of Charity, 1912–1992,” Social Problems 44, no. 4 (november 1997): 436; Scott Shershow,
The Work and The Gift (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2005), 130ff. On the impor-
tance of philanthropy as a source of intra-class cohesion, see Francine Ostrower, Why the
Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy (princeton: princeton University press, 1997). 
concentrations of wealth and reduce inequality, but rather offered another way
to structure it. 
there was an undeniable aspect of agency to the restructuring of capital in
these years, but to call the men who initiated these changes “millionaires,”
“captains of industry,” and “leaders of finance” is also to say something about
the structure of wealth creation. they were not aristocrats, farmers, or mer-
chants. their position was due less to birth or privilege than to their ability to
amass surplus wealth in the management of business ventures.10 they were
millionaires, but millionaires in a particular economy, conducting daily busi-
ness through a growing network of managers, accountants, and business
officers. Canada’s most successful financiers and industrialists profited by their
ability to mobilize, organize, and incorporate, and these skills began to matter
more than thrift, self-reliance, and diligence.11
Defending “the place and function in society of men of great wealth” in
1899, one of Canada’s pre-eminent political economists aligned the rise of the
millionaire with the public interest. in a widely read essay, Queen’s University
professor Adam Shortt described the corporation as the “economic triumph of
man over nature,” able to secure the supply of an increasing number of wants
with a decreasing proportion of human effort.12 the corporate form and the pat-
tern of trust and monopoly that followed, he asserted, whether deliberate or not,
were inherently philanthropic, reducing wasteful competition, increasing pro-
ductivity, and raising standards of living. Shortt’s interpretation was not unique.
the productivity increases obtained by large-scale industry and corporate orga-
nization were acknowledged and celebrated by many observers at the turn of
the century, including social reformers as well as industrial elites.13
if some saw the rise of the corporation itself as a benevolent force in
Canadian life, others could point to a number of direct links between business
power and philanthropy. Most obviously, wealthy businessmen were moving
into leadership positions in the community. the corporate business model
began to saturate the organizations of civil society, with new leaders transfer-
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10 there were between 48 and 60 millionaires in Canada in 1910. presidents of banking, insur-
ance, and railway companies earned in the range of $25,000 per year. Directorships and
shareholdings at early stages of company development of peers helped to build personal
wealth. the absence of taxes for most of this period helped to build wealth rapidly. Bliss, 345. 
11 trachtenberg, 81. 
12 Adam Shortt, “in Defense of Millionaires,” Canadian Magazine (1899) in Canadian Political
Thought, ed. H.D. Forbes (toronto: Oxford University press, 1987), 170. the article was also
discussed in The Montreal Gazette (30 September 1899). 
13 For example, many addresses to the 1914 Social Service Council Congress made favourable
references to the efficiency and productivity of modern industry. See especially Rev. J.W.
Aikens, “Jesus Christ and industry,” Social Service Council of Canada, Social Service
Congress, Ottawa, 1914: Report of addresses and proceedings (toronto: the Social Service
Council of Canada, 1914), 42–5. 
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ring their knowledge and expertise, as well as their wealth, to organized phil-
anthropic endeavors. in time, corporations also began to donate money directly
to philanthropic causes. 
Philanthropy by leaders of finance and industry 
Reorganizing the capital structure of business offered several advantages to
Canadian entrepreneurs, increasing the liquidity of their wealth, providing
income in the form of salary and dividends, and freeing their time from routine
concerns, whether on the shop floor or in the front office. As individuals, these
men continued to practice traditional modes of charity, giving spontaneously
when asked and weekly to the church; however, new patterns of giving were
also appearing. Business leaders began to give, not simply as wealthy men, but
as wealthy men who represented corporate interests. the many philanthropies
of edmund Walker, general manager and later president of the Bank of
Commerce, were recognized as helping “to create a new relationship between
the banking profession and the community at large.”14 Walker’s involvements,
which included founding of and leadership positions in the toronto Board of
trade and the Canadian Bankers’ Association, the toronto University (chair-
man of the board), the Royal Ontario Museum, the Art Museum of toronto, the
national Gallery of Art in Ottawa, and memberships in the national
Battlefields Commission and the Champlain Society, enabled him to “zealously
promote the legitimate interests” of the bank in a variety of social settings.
Walker skillfully leveraged the opportunities and connections he made with the
Bank of Commerce to raise money for cultural causes he was committed to, and
used the network of contacts forged in building these associations and institu-
tions to the benefit of the bank.15
Walker was unique in his ability to integrate business and philanthropy,
and bring old and new money together in the support of common causes; how-
ever, the reciprocal relationship between the corporate form and philanthropy
was not. Historian thomas Adams suggests in Buying Respectability that aspir-
ing elites were driven by their desire to transform economic capital into social
capital.16 Although insufficient to gain social recognition, business success
allowed for philanthropic endeavors that would support claims to social lead-
ership. Adams does not pursue the point; this effort, however, implies a
business-like understanding of respectability as something which could be
196
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14 Victor Ross, A History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce (toronto: Oxford University press,
1922), 101–2. 
15 thomas Adams, Buying Respectability: Philanthropy and Urban Society in Transnational
Perspective, 1840s to 1930s (Bloomington: indiana University press, 2009), 23–6, 113–16. 
16 ibid., 81, 116, 120–1. Adams observes that turn of the century toronto was different than new
york, with too few old money élites to organize and finance the building of civic institutions
without financial infusions from social newcomers, 113. 
acquired in a commercial transaction. incorporation created the opportunity to
operate business on vast scale and amass great wealth; philanthropy offered a
vehicle for newly wealthy industrialists and entrepreneurs to convert economic
standing to social standing. Adams’ analysis is somewhat reductive, minimiz-
ing other factors including feelings of religious obligation; however, many of
the names prominent in philanthropy during this period were those associated
with the transformation of the Canadian economy, building fortunes from
investments in banking, manufacturing, and the retail trade. Regardless of moti-
vation, they rose from the middle class, often with little formal education,
approaching philanthropy with the same methods and attitudes that had made
them successful in business. 
industrialist Joseph Flavelle is representative. Although known for his per-
sonal “out of pocket” generosity, Flavelle’s donations were also guided by series
of informal rules modeled on business practice. When considering gifts to the
church, for example, he made distinctions between the operating funds needed
to conduct regular church business (which he believed should come from the
congregation) and funds for special projects such as missions and building cam-
paigns, which might rightly be considered the responsibility of the wealthy.17
Like many of his peers, he preferred dollar matching the contributions of con-
gregations to outright donations as a means to avoid creating dependency.
Supported by an administrative structure, heads of corporations were often gen-
erous donors of time as well as money. in spite of his many business interests,
Flavelle taught Sunday school, assuming the role of principal and arranging pro-
fessional development programmes for teachers in what was regarded as the best
organized Sunday school in the denomination. Flavelle also took on leadership
roles in fund-raising for the toronto General Hospital and the University of
toronto, marshalling the resources of his business colleagues for important civic
causes. Although these campaigns concentrated primarily on personal donations,
small contributions arrived from the companies with which Flavelle was
involved. Later campaigns, particularly the 1918 effort to reduce the toronto
General Hospital deficit, saw increased corporate contributions. 
the event that highlighted Flavelle’s evolving experience with corporate
philanthropy, however, was not his success but his failure to recognize chang-
ing public expectations during World War i. While Flavelle quietly made
generous donations to patriotic causes from his personal income, he believed
that the profits legitimately earned by business should be retained and rein-
vested in new plants and equipment to sustain the economy in the postwar era.
During the war the William Davies Company, a meat-packing conglomerate of
197
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17 Flavelle remains Canada’s best researched millionaire. the details come from Michael Bliss,
A Canadian Millionaire (toronto: University of toronto press, 1992), 89, 90, 161, 448–9,
356–60. 
which Flavelle was president and principle shareholder, insisted on business as
usual, and business was very good. public outrage at high profits might have
been offset by patriotic gestures, but in the absence of any direct corporate giv-
ing from the company he led, Flavelle was vilified as a profiteer. 
At a time when state power was limited, municipalities depended upon
business leaders to finance and rally support for many community initiatives.
Uncomfortable with a haphazard approach, business donors preferred their
philanthropy to be business-like, systematic, and broad-reaching. they did not
see philanthropy as a profit-sacrificing venture, but generally understood the
growth of civil society, their personal accumulation of social capital, and the
growth of business as interrelated. 
Philanthropy as group Action 
As businessmen assumed leadership positions in the community, the hallmarks
of the corporate form (hierarchical structures of management, centralization
and departmentalization, horizontal and vertical expansion, improved planning
and co-ordination, expanded capitalization) were transferred to Canada’s muse-
ums, orchestras, hospitals, and universities, as well as agencies of social
reform. 
Movements of social reform during the first phase of corporate capitalism
have already received attention from Canadian historians. Charity in pre-indus-
trial society has been seen, at least by comparison, as relatively spontaneous,
unorganized, and rooted in the obligations of religion and community.
Advocates of a modernized philanthropy called for charity to be put on a busi-
ness-like basis, which they believed would ultimately be successful in
removing the causes of poverty. in the past, the giver of charity was not overly
concerned if his “gift” was used wisely. the modern philanthropist saw dona-
tions as something closer to investments, and sought a return on donations in
the form of moral improvement.18
Convinced that the unsupervised distribution of alms would create depen-
dency, a movement to organize charities appeared in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. initially, Associated Charities and Charity
Organization Societies emphasized “friendly visiting” of the poor by volunteers
who would investigate and register each case in order to protect the wealthy
from fraud and the needy from pauperization. personal contact with a positive
moral influence was regarded as more important than the distribution of funds. 
in the decade after the turn of the century, charity organization entered a 
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18 On the distinction between charity as gift and philanthropy as investment, see Mariana
Valverde, “Moral Capital,” Canadian Journal of Law and Sociology 9, no. 1. (1994): 221ff;
and Alan kidd, “philanthropy and the ‘social history paradigm’,” Social History 21, no. 2
(May 1996): 187–8. 
second phase, with businessmen leading city-wide coalitions of charity reform in
Winnipeg, Montreal, toronto, Ottawa, Calgary, Regina, and Vancouver.19 Business
inspired reformers, including women as well as men, promised a progressive
approach: social services would be efficient, centralized, and scientific in the use
of professional paid staff and the case-work method.20 the plethora of agencies
operating within each community would become associated, and each association
would be overseen by a committee of businessmen in the public interest. 
One of the principle mechanisms of the Charity Association movement
involved issuing cards of endorsement to agencies judged worthy of support. in
order to receive an endorsement, an agency was required to register with the cen-
tral association, to raise funds in an approved manner, to keep proper financial
records, and hold regular board meetings. the frequently stated objective was to
create a “better business bureau” of social services that would monitor and guar-
antee the financial viability and honesty of member charities, and coordinate
programs on a city-wide basis to prevent duplication and overlap. Giving money
was not enough; expenditures had to be managed to be morally useful. Because
it was difficult to measure the success of the charitable process (that is, to know
if characters were truly reformed and pauperism avoided), philanthropists
devoted their attention to procedural concerns. Distinctions once drawn between
the deserving and undeserving poor were now applied to agencies.21
While some scholars have identified conflict between the service delivery and
fund-raising aspects of philanthropies, the corporate form had considerable cross-
class appeal.22 Generally, the organizational reforms initiated by businessmen
were well received within the social service community, which had also begun to
equate progress with professionalization, organization, specialization, and effi-
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19 On Associated Charities in Winnipeg, see J.S. Woodsworth, My Neighbour (toronto:
Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, 1911), 280ff. For toronto, see J.A. turnbull,
“What does Associated Charities mean and what is its object?” in Saving the Canadian City:
the first phase 1880–1920, ed. paul Rutherford (toronto: University of toronto press, 1974),
120–2. 
20 Middle- and upper-class women were equally business-like in their approaches to organizing,
financing, and managing philanthropy, and just as dedicated to increased efficiency through
improved management. See peter Baskerville, A Silent Revolution? Gender and Wealth in
English Canada, 1860–1930 (Montréal and kingston: McGill-Queen’s University press,
2008), 258ff. On the role of women in promoting the establishment of Associated Charities
throughout Canada, see Rosa Shaw, Proud Heritage: A History of the National Council of
Women of Canada (toronto: Ryerson press, 1957), 96–9. 
21 the deserving poor were family oriented, willing to work, and dreamt of achieving indepen-
dence through hard work and right living. the problems they faced were generally not of their
own making. the deserving charity was efficient, centrally organized, and professionally
staffed, maintained a careful accounting of cases and expenditures. Loseke, 432. 
22 trachtenberg, 23. Gale Willis, however, emphasizes the competing interests of female case-
workers and male fund-raisers. Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience: Business ad Social
Work in Toronto, 1918–1957 (toronto: University of toronto press, 1995). 
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ciency. As the emphasis on skill and technique grew, the status of well-meaning
volunteers became ambiguous and the need for stable sources of funds more press-
ing. Social work became increasingly agency oriented, a corporate activity rather
than an individual practice. professionalization created dependency and success-
ful capital campaigns created an ongoing need for operating funds.23
there has been a tendency to study philanthropy directed at social reform
separately from efforts directed at the building up of cultural institutions. But
all of the philanthropic projects of business elites, whether in the realm of cul-
ture, health care, social, or municipal reform, followed a strikingly similar
pattern of organizational innovation, with business leaders regulating the flow
of funds by making compliance with a business model the criteria for funding.
Consider developments in the realm of culture. Before the turn of the cen-
tury, cultural experiences — both high and low — took place for the most part
in localized and relatively intimate settings. the roles of producer and con-
sumer were fluid rather than fixed and generally did not involve the exchange
of money. After the turn of the century, culture was increasingly reconstructed
within the realm of commodity relations. While amateur efforts certainly did
not disappear, they lost their central role in the making of culture.24 Working
class Canadians and urban elites both shifted away from amateur entertain-
ments; however, during the time when popular culture was being
commercialized, elite culture was professionalized and institutionalized fol-
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23 Wills, 137; Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career,
1880–1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1965). 
philanthropy and capitalism were also directly linked in projects of housing reform ini-
tiated by industrialists Herbert Ames (in Montreal) and G. Frank Beers (in toronto). Following
the model pioneered in Britain, philanthropic businessmen devised co-partnership ventures
which had private investors subscribing to shares in housing development companies that
would rent well-designed units to working-class tenants. the rents would cover the operating
costs and pay shareholders a small dividend, in the range of five percent, and therefore attrac-
tive only to philanthropists. At the time, capitalists investing in housing projects generally
expected a profit of around twenty-five percent. these schemes were inherently conservative,
relying upon the inequalities of wealth characteristic of monopoly capitalism to solve the very
social problems it has fostered, not by raising workers’ wages, but by the voluntary and case-
by-case modification of profits. However, Ames, Beers and others who promoted the so-called
“philanthropy and Five percent” model believed that it provided entrepreneurs with the “hope
of a fair return,” and therefore offered a feasible solution to housing reform. Herbert Brown
Ames, The City Below the Hill (1897), (toronto: University of toronto press, 1972), 112. On
the toronto experience see Sean purdy, “‘this is not a company; it is a cause’: class, gender
and the toronto Housing Company, 1912-1920.” Urban History Review 21, no. 2 (1993) and
thomas Adam, “philanthropic Landmarks: the toronto trail from a Comparative perspective,
1870s to the 1930s,” Urban History Review 30, no. 1 (Oct 2001). On Montreal, see Melanie
Methot, “Herbert Brown Ames: political Reformer and enforcer.” Urban History Review 31,
no. 2 (Spring 2003). Also see Adams, Buying Respectability, 80ff. 
24 Maria tippett, Making Culture: English Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey
Commission (toronto: University of toronto press, 1990), 186. 
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These illustrations appeared in a pamphlet promoting the advantages of planned giving.
Before charities are associated, a donor is besieged on all sides by requests for money.
After federation, donations flow efficiently. Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research, 1917.
Credit: The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto.
lowing the corporate model. Although most Canadians embraced the opportu-
nities presented by the market to the extent that they were able to do so, elites
reacted negatively to the commercialization of culture, repressing or refusing to
acknowledge similar shifts in the organization of their own practices. profit was
regarded as inconsistent with the higher goals of beauty, truth, high morals,
community service, and spiritual fulfillment. At the same time, the production
and consumption of high culture required funds to support the construction and
operation of permanent venues, to assemble collections of art and instruments,
and to pay professional managers and performers.25
the creation of the Art Museum of toronto offers a case in point. Here was
a cultural institution open to the public, but managed by paid professionals and
governed closely by a board of directors. the museum founders, virtually all
leading businessmen, circulated a prospectus in support of the application for
incorporation. Donors subscribed as shareholders and were issued different
classes of shares in accordance with the size of their contribution.26 the model
of the non-profit seeking membership corporation offered several advantages to
urban elites as they sought to build institutions of high culture.27 it was famil-
iar and successful. the structure of control by directorate facilitated the
development of intra-class bonds. By vesting control in a limited and self-per-
petuating group, the corporate form was ideally suited to collaborative
fund-raising, distributing the costs and risks associated with meeting the cap-
ital requirements of universities, museums, concert houses, and permanent
collections. A privately funded corporation was also insulated from market
pressures and political interference. Fund-raising campaigns, structured as col-
laborative or collective group efforts, offered an arena to build and to test
social relations outside of formal relations of business, building bonds of rec-
iprocity rather than competition, reinforcing ties within the “inter-locking
directorate” that distinguished community elites.28 Recognizing the obliga-
tions of reciprocity, business leaders honoured one another’s power with
donations to each other’s causes. Collaborative efforts to raise money were not
new, but previously had been carried out in a leisurely manner with minimal
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25 On the professionalization of museum collecting, see Adams, 27. 
26 Toronto Daily Star (4 February 1901). 
27 paul DiMaggio, “Cultural entrepreneurship in nineteenth-Century Boston” in Rethinking
Popular Culture, eds. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson (Berkeley: University of
California press, 1981), 381ff. 
28 Joseph Flavelle began his fund-raising efforts for the toronto General Hospital by singling out
five prominent businessmen for large donations to establish a basis for similar future gifts. He
later repaid the social obligation with reciprocal donations to the projects of his peers. Bliss, A
Canadian Millionaire, 160, 462. Valverde examines philanthropy as a tool of inter-class social
control, but largely ignores equally important intra-class pressures. On this theme, see
Ostrower. Adams explains that the toronto project combined approaches previously used in
new york and Leipzig, 23–8. 
planning and publicity.29 Fund-raising was now conducted on a larger and more
visible scale. 
the projects of business elites, whether in high culture, health care, social
or municipal reform, private clubs, athletic associations, and literary societies
followed a strikingly similar pattern of organizational innovation. Building the
institutions of civil society helped to build cultural and social distinctions, set-
ting a “moral agenda” supportive of economic development.30 philanthropic
institutions and fund-raising processes provided additional sites for class for-
mation. new wealth was linked to institutions with cultural prestige to secure
status and gain recognition.31 the publication of names of donors and commit-
tee members in the annual reports of charitable societies and the role of the
press in building the reputations of benevolent donors was crucial for status
building.32 in this way, philanthropy helped to organize social distance, rein-
forcing inter-class distinctions and strengthening intra-class cohesion,
reproducing the class relations of corporate capitalism. 
Boards weighted with representatives from business, women as well as men,
set the expectations and operating standards during their formative period. the
pressures exerted were both direct (a commitment to hierarchal organization, pro-
fessional management, an insistence on record- and bookkeeping to demonstrate
effectiveness and fiscal responsibility) and indirect. Less directly, the economic
success of Canadian enterprise during these boom years in itself encouraged pro-
fessional administrators to see the business model as the ideal form of
administrative organization.33 Beyond the board level, donor expectations for
standardized reporting, including the requirements imposed by government on
agencies appealing for public support, such as wartime charities during World
War i, were a growing factor in shaping the structure of philanthropy. 
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29 Aileen Ross, “Organized philanthropy in an Urban Community,” Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science 18, no. 4 (november 1953): 475. 
30 Valverde, Age of Light, Soap and Water, 29ff. 
31 Adams, 17. 
32 kidd, 189. 
33 the ideals of industrial management, including efficiency, specialization, hierarchical organi-
zation, and measures of effectiveness, were also decisive influences in the reform of
government administration during this period. See J. e. Hodgetts, et al., The Biography of an
Institution, the Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908–1967 (Montréal and kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University press, 1972), 65–6, 71; J.e. Hodgetts, “implicit values in the
administration of public affairs,” in Canadian Public Administration: Discipline and
Profession, ed. kenneth kernaghan (toronto: Butterworths, 1983), 30; and “A Farwell
Contribution from Griffenhage and Associates Limited” in The Civilian, Canadian Civil
Service Staff publication (February 1921), 69, cited by V. Seymour Wilson, “the influence of
Organizational theory in Canadian public Administration,” in Canadian Public
Administration, 106–7. 
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Corporate giving 
in addition to businessmen giving as businessmen, there is evidence of corpo-
rations beginning to give as corporations. the Bank of Commerce was an early
leader in field. the bank’s first donations date from 1891, when the directors
authorized a contribution of $2,000 to the Amateur Athletic Association of
toronto, to be followed with an annual subscription of $500 a year for five
years, on condition that the bank’s toronto staff be entitled to free use of the
privileges of the association. that same year, $200 was set aside to endow a
scholarship in economic and political Science at the University of toronto,
cash prizes were offered for papers contributed by Bank of Commerce staff to
the Journal of the Canadian Bankers Association, and a pension plan was
established for bank employees.34
initially, most corporations followed this model, giving to causes that had
the potential to be of direct benefit to employees, but which were none the less
voluntary and benevolent in intent. philanthropy in areas of social reform,
health care, and culture has been described by theorists as investments that
sought a return in moral capital. interestingly, efforts to stimulate moral char-
acter in the unemployed were echoed in corporate donations that were
frequently described as investments in the morale of employees. Contributions
made by the Bank of Commerce to build an “esprit de corps” among white col-
lar workers were echoed by industrial concerns hosting company picnics and
summer excursions.35 it was understood that philanthropic gestures could build
loyalty and encourage a more positive attitude toward workplace discipline in
the office as well as the factory floor. 
Corporate giving expanded from these limited beginnings, with donations
at the discretion of the owner, to support of causes with a broader national or
philanthropic character perceived to involve considerations of public service.
World War i marked a watershed for corporate donations in Canada. At the
Bank of Commerce, for example, the policy was to extend the use of its facili-
ties to all legitimate funds and projects related to the war effort. public
subscriptions for a number of patriotic campaigns were accepted at bank
branches and remitted to the toronto head office free of charge. the bank also
sold War Savings Bonds and thrift stamps and participated in campaigns for
Victory Loans, encouraging customers to withdraw their deposits from the bank
and redirect them to government coffers. Bank employees were encouraged to
take family vacations working on farms. Branch managers represented the gov-
ernment, calling farmers into the branch to encourage farm modernization.
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34 Victor Ross, History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, 118–20. 
35 On the Bank of Commerce, see Ross, 119. On examples of summer excursions hosted by com-
panies for employees, see Toronto Daily Star (13 July 1901 and 22 July 1901); Globe and Mail
(17 August 1903). 
Cash prizes were offered at autumn fairs to stimulate the development of ani-
mal husbandry skills. the board also voted donations to various war funds, the
Canadian patriotic Fund received a total of $200,000, the Canadian Red Cross
Society $5,000, the Belgian Relief Fund $2,500.36 the University Overseas
Hospital’s various yMCA funds, the Halifax Relief fund, Catholic Army Huts,
and the italian-Canadian Soldiers’ Aid of Canada fund all received contribu-
tions. in addition to direct donations, the Royal Bank established a “pay Day”
fund to supply the Red Cross with bandages during the war. Staff contributed
to the fund with deductions from their pay cheques and additional food and
clothing was collected by local branches.37
Wartime gifts established a pattern of corporate giving during a period of
rapid growth in capitalization and organizational complexity, accompanied by
high and often controversial profits. the presence of patriotic charities rein-
forced trends in corporate giving by providing causes of unquestionable merit,
patriotic in purpose, and stringently regulated by government.38 Corporations
gave for reasons of patriotism; they recognized, however, that good will was
created through philanthropy. the relationship, of course, worked both ways:
during the war organized charities saw the usefulness of corporations as a
source of funds.39
the transition from proprietary to corporate organization entailed a broaden-
ing of authority in both ownership and management that allowed for the carry over
of personal values to companies at the board level. in some companies, particu-
larly those that continued to be privately owned or dominated by a single owner,
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36 Victor Ross, A History of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, 339–40, 349, 354–8, 369–70. 
37 noted in a memo from Gordon Rabchuk, Senior Archivist, Royal Bank of Canada, to the
author. December 10, 2009. 
38 Rulings in corporate and tax law have played a critical role in shaping corporate philanthropy
in the United States. indeed, Mark Sharfman convincingly argues that the legal process was
one of principle vehicles in legitimizing and therefore encouraging corporate giving in
America. this did not happen in Canada. it has been suggested that the lack of litigation here
implies a general acceptance of corporate giving; however, the absence of a comparable body
of law is puzzling. to the extent that philanthropy has been the subject of law in Canada, most
of the efforts to “police the deduction” have been directed towards the regulation of charities.
By comparison, American lawmakers have emphasized the regulation of corporations, both to
protect shareholders and to limit the power of corporations to influence politics. in Canada,
then, the emphasis has been on questions of entitlement; in America, on the power of the
donor. On America, see Mark Sharfman, “Changing institutional Roles: the evolution of
Corporate philanthropy, 1883–1953, Business and Society 33, no. 3 (December 1994). On
Canada, see Bella Martin, “the Validity of Corporate Gifts,” The Philanthropist (1987), and
Ontario Law Reform Commission, “Supervision of Charities by Revenue Canada: A Brief
History” in Report on the Law of Charities, Vol. 1, 1996. 
39 Ross argues that corporate donations to the patriotic Fund were crucial in building the idea that
philanthropic activity could serve as a means to establish good relations with the public. Aileen
Ross, “Organized philanthropy in an Urban Community,” 477. 
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for example eaton’s or Massey-Harris, the line between private benevolence and
company giving continued to be loosely drawn. in other cases, businesses began
to develop an increasingly sophisticated sense of themselves as distinctive corpo-
rate entities, including a growing awareness of their role in society.40
Stage Two — incorporation: to unite or include within something already
formed 
in the immediate postwar years, Canadian companies, facing new taxes and
expectations, negotiating new relations with employees and governments,
struggled to determine the appropriate charitable response to rising demands
for charitable gifts.41 “Are your Charitable Gifts Above Average?” asked the
Financial Post in 1949.42 Corporate giving, it reported, now made up 13 percent
of the total charitable giving in Canada, with small companies giving slightly
more than the large companies as a percentage of pre-tax profits.43 George
Black, president of Canadian Breweries Ltd., warned in a widely publicized
address, “[B]usiness and its good intentions are being strangled by demands for
money and manpower.44 in the fiscal year ending October 31, 1951, Canadian
Breweries and its affiliated companies had made 1,411 separate donations total-
ing $200,000. An average of five requests were received every business day. A
full-time office worker was required to administer corporate giving, and time
was spent by executives evaluating appeals which now often included requests
to canvass employees in the workplace. Like his pre-war predecessors, Black
proposed that the “business of raising money” would be conducted more effi-
ciently through a centralized fund-raising organization. He, like many other
executives, called for the creation of a central board under the federal govern-
ment to confirm the worthiness of the organizations requesting funding. 
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40 For a very interesting and parallel examination of the connection between entrepreneurial suc-
cess and philanthropy in Japan during this same period, see Mark Fruin, “From philanthropy
to paternalism in the noda Soy Sauce industry: pre-Corporate and Corporate Charity in
Japan.” Business History Review 56, no. 2 (1982). 
41 Several theorists suggest that the most distinctive feature of modern philanthropy is not the
professionalization and organization of the delivery of services, but the development of prac-
tices of solicitation unprecedented in their degree of explicitness and legitimacy. Agencies no 
longer wait for gifts to be given, but organize their efforts to compel donors to “yield up” the
sums demanded. On the shift from giving to “gift-extraction” see John Seeley, Community
Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy (toronto: University of toronto press, 1957), 5; and ilana
Silber, “Modern philanthropy: Reassessing the Viability of a Maussian perspective,” in Marcel
Mauss: A Centenary Tribute, eds. Wendy James and n.J. Allen (new york: Berghahn Books,
1998), 145. 
42 Financial Post (4 June 1949). 
43 Gordon and Svanhuit Josie, Charitable Donations in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare
Council, 1949). 
44 Globe and Mail (1 December 1951); Financial Post (8 December 1951); Canadian Business
(January 1954). 
Rapid increases in solicitation were a frequent theme in the press. the
Financial Post revisited the issue in 1953, describing the president of “com-
pany x”, normally a man of swift, decisive action, as flummoxed by the
“perennial” and “growing problem” of good works. this representative execu-
tive was acutely conscious of his corporate responsibilities and opportunities,
but uncertain how to adjudicate between the increase number of worthy causes.
How much should be given, and who should decide? What was the impact of
turning down requests?45
After an initial period of uncertainty came the postwar boom. Rapid
growth financed by stock offerings and foreign investment shifted corporate
control from leading stockholders to professional management, often with
MBAs, brought in from outside the company. Similar changes were happening
in the organization of Canada’s voluntary associations. the number of
Community Chests expanded from five, before 1930, to 47 by 1949.46 Almost
half of Canada’s largest national voluntary organizations had been founded
since 1930.47
One of the responses to proliferating requests for support came in the form
of a succession of special studies, most funded by leading Canadian compa-
nies, all eager to determine the norms of corporate contributions. the most
prominent of these studies was Corporate Giving in Canada (1953), commis-
sioned by a self-appointed council of business leaders and funded by
donations from 105 Canadian businesses.48 Collectively, the net income of the
878 corporations involved in the study had increased by 110 percent in the
period 1946 to 1951. their combined charitable contributions had increased
by 160 percent. Approximately 1.9 percent of declared profits were donated
for charitable purposes. patterns of giving were shifting dramatically away
from religious organizations and modestly away from Community Chests and
universities, and toward the construction of hospitals. in two out of three com-
panies, decisions were still made by a sole individual, usually the president or
a top official. the higher the amounts involved, the higher the deciding author-
ity. Four of five companies now listed donations as a budget item, but giving
decisions ranged from haphazard to organized. Some companies gave a fixed
amount, some a percentage of pre-tax profits, some calculated contributions
on a per employee basis. Some contributed only to the major appeals, others
acknowledged that the personal views of corporation executives were a factor
in decision-making, others pointed to the actions of their competitors or the
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45 Financial Post (7 november 1953). 
46 Albert Shea, ed., Corporate Giving in Canada (toronto: Clarke, irwin & Co, 1953), 128;
tillotson, “A new taxpayer for a new State,” 142. 
47 See also John Morgan, “Social Welfare needs of a Changing Society: the new Canada.” The
Social Service Review 28, no. 4 (December 1954): 407. 
48 Shea, 48ff. 
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Bringing Philanthropy into the Corporate Structure
In the post-war period structured donations programs with formal policies, administra-
tive mechanisms and a set funding cycle embed philanthropic norms within corporate
capitalism. The corporate donations flow at Inco, circa 1981. Courtesy of ValeInco.
pressure exerted by customers. Most giving was determined by a single indi-
vidual, but corporations with a number of branches frequently had a small
budget for local branches to administer. 
While there was “no single yardstick” to determine corporate giving or to
measure the worthiness of recipient agencies, businesses with a policy were
seen to have an advantage in handling new requests. Albert Shea included state-
ments of the giving policies devised by six different companies to serve as
guides and inspiration.49 these were largely procedural in nature, detailing how
requests were to be handled, specifying who had the authority to approve dona-
tions, setting out rules for record-keeping, which letters to send if a request was
refused, and which letters to send if a request approved. these procedures sel-
dom included follow up on how money was spent, or to confirm the
effectiveness of donations. in the pre-war period, philanthropy had been
reshaped by the involvement of corporate leaders; in the immediate post-war
period corporations brought philanthropic giving into their business models. 
When interviewed, business leaders advanced a number of justifications
for corporate giving. the availability of tax deductions was noted, but not dis-
cussed as a significant motivator. instead, executives emphasized increased
pressure to give from the growing number of agencies, from customers, and by
the perceived need to keep up with donations made by competitors. the
nation’s Community Chests also played a role, successfully placing the need for
donations to support local causes on the business agenda.50 With both the giv-
ing and receiving institutions becoming increasingly national in reach and
dependent upon professional managers, direct contact between those allocating
funds and those in need was less frequent. Community Chests filled the gap,
providing a recognized, professional vehicle for giving, free of fraud and
favoritism, guaranteed to meet genuine needs. On the national level, businesses
found themselves pressured to fund the expansion of educational institutions
and expected to fill the funding gaps left by American foundations as they redi-
rected their donations away from Canada and towards under-developed nations
as part of the Cold War effort to build new alliances.51
not all pressures were external. Within the business sector, the power to
control a large flow of wealth was seen to carry important, if vaguely
expressed, social responsibilities beyond the obligations to shareholders and
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49 ibid., 4, 12–3, 28–35. 
50 On the role of business in the development of federated financing organizations, including
Community Chests and the United Way, see Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience: Business
and Social Work in Toronto, 1918–1957 (toronto: University of toronto press, 1995), and
tillotson. 
51 “Corporate Giving to University education,” Canadian Business (June 1954); “that knock at
our door will be the universities looking for guess what ...,” Financial Post (7 november
1962); “Big U.S. Fund Money pulling Out of Canada,” Financial Post (22 April 1961). 
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employees.52 As one executive pragmatically explained, his company used to
keep giving to a minimum, but “has now reached a stature where it is expected
to make charitable donations on a reasonable scale, and it is logical that this
should be done.”53 Or, as another noted in a statement that alluded to the val-
ues of a much earlier generation of entrepreneurs: 
As i see it, there is no such thing as a “self-made man” for the obvious reason
that everybody’s earning or profits are derived in some way or another from the
community at large .... it is therefore, only reasonable that some part of those
profits should be devoted to purposes or objects that are designed to advance
the interests of the community ... the better and stronger the community
becomes, the better will be the business of every competent member of it.54
Businessmen also saw voluntary giving as an opportunity to forestall the
growth of the state and the inevitable rise in taxation required to support big
government. “in the long run,” explained the Chair of the Company
Contributions Committee of the Community Chests and Councils of Canada,
“our choice isn’t whether we support these services or not. the choice is, shall
we do it voluntarily and keep them locally controlled, or shall we abdicate the
responsibility to the government and pay a tax.”55
in the immediate postwar period, corporate giving was driven by an
increasingly complex mix of motives. While corporate leaders touted voluntary
giving as the “bulwark of free enterprise” and the embodiment of the democra-
tic ideal, they also recognized the value of contributions for business purposes.
philanthropy in the community helped to offset the de-personalization of cor-
porate expansion and foreign ownership. At the upper levels, the involvement
of senior executives in local campaigns was regarded as good for a firm’s rep-
utation. But participation also had a value within the business, providing
opportunities for promising young men to gain experience and display their
executive abilities. Fund-raising drives for the Community Chest, one observer
reported, had now superseded the church as an adjunct to the business career.56
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52 Morgan, 407; see also “policies for Corporate Giving,” Business Quarterly xxVi, no. 4,
(Winter 1961): 247. 
53 Shea, 34. 
54 ibid., 65. 
55 “Do Canadian Companies Give enough?” Industrial Canada (September 1957): 63. 
56 Aileen Ross, “philanthropic Activity and the Business Career,” Social Forces 32, no. 3 (March
1954): 280. in a series of studies on “Wellsville,” a pseudonym for anglo-Montréal, Ross
described the increasingly symbiotic relationship between organized philanthropy and corpo-
rate Canada. professional organizers, for example, employed a variety of tactics to increase
corporate donations: exploiting rivalries between firms to secure larger commitments, ensur-
ing requests were made by important customers, and researching the net profits and payrolls
of public companies to set quotas for corporate donations. Aileen Ross, “the Social Control
of philanthropy,” American Journal of Sociology 58, no. 5 (March 1953): 457–8. 
not every businessman agreed, but as more and more companies participated,
more were expected to participate.
in 1951, only five percent of Canadian businesses had formal committees
to administer charitable giving; by 1963, over half had formed committees.
Seventy-nine percent of the 224 companies surveyed in a study of company con-
tributions had donations budgets.57 Some shareholders resisted, but most
recognized the need “to get along with the public.”58 Although corporate giving
made little direct contribution to profits, it was seen to enhance the reputation of
business in society, promoting a sense of respectability and good will.59
Business faces new Challenges
A decade later, the respectability and good will that had been proudly cultivated
by business was challenged by changing social circumstances and attitudes.
the criticism directed at business was intense and wide-ranging. Groups
demanding action included consumers, anti-pollution activists, youth, minority
and ethnic groups, and a host of government agencies responding to voter con-
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57 John Watson and Monteath Douglas, Company Contributions in Canada (Montréal: national
industrial Conference Board, 1963); Canadian Business (October 1963): 34, 37. While most
corporate leaders cooperated, not all were comfortable with the transformation of philan-
thropy. in 1952 Charles Burton, president of Simpson’s department stores, objected that the
professionalization of social services offered the opportunity “for buying off one’s obligations
to one’s under-privileged fellow mortals by merely contributing money .... But it is one thing
to learn of social problems in annual reports by professional workers, and another thing
entirely to learn of these problems by personal contact and individual services. young men
coming forward now in the business life of our community are allowed the privilege of serv-
ing on campaign committees to raise annually large sums of money for social services lumped
together in a sort of incorporation. it is very businesslike. But ... [a]s future leaders of our 
industrial and political life, they should ... meet not as members of fund-raising campaign
teams but as interested members of social organizations ...  the raising or making of money is
of secondary importance to the doing of work, whether in a business such as a great depart-
ment store, or in social service.”  Cited in Samuel Martin, Financing Humanistic Service
(toronto:  McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 53–4. 
58 Marketing, (2 April 1965). 
59 Shirley tillotson has identified an intriguingly similar pattern of activity in organized labour
at this time. Both corporate and union leaders identified welfare work as a project with con-
siderable public relations value and the potential to mobilize members/employees. While
welfare work was not central to the labour movement, it was a new and distinctive addition.
the efforts of both labour and management to support active volunteerism and charitable
fundraising offers a new perspective on the postwar consensus, with both groups embracing
the language of shared community and engaging in efforts essentially supplementary to the
welfare state in their pursuit of good public opinion. it was also the case that representatives
of both groups could be found sharing the same platform to protest the rapid and uncoordi-
nated explosion in charitable services and fundraising appeals. Financial Post, December 8,
1951. Shirley tillotson, “When Our Membership Awakens”: Welfare Work and Canadian
Union Activism, 1950-1965.” Labour / Le Travail, Vol. 40 (Fall, 1997).
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cerns. Although satisfied with its own performance, business was placed on the
defensive by the rapid shift in expectations. A period of relative introspection
followed, with business reconsidering its relationship to society. The Canadian
Banker, for example, invited a panel of experts to explore the idea of corporate
citizenship. emphasizing the problem of rapid change, the journal concluded: 
it is abundantly clear that the responsibilities demanded by society cannot be
discharged simply by the usual program, such as donations to summer camps
for children, or by sponsorship of public concerts or hockey or ski teams ....
the relationships now demanded are with specific segments of society to help
solve specific problems. the operating words are “working relationships”
rather than “charitable donations.”60
Arguing that the strength of business lay in practical problem solving, the
authors called upon business to accept the need for change and manage the
process rather than defend the status quo. “Being a member of ‘the Disease of
the Month Club’ through donations was no longer enough,” instead business
needed to build bridges and reach out to discontented groups.61
the shift in expectations was the subject of a 1971 symposium organized
by the Conference Board, an independent business research organization,
which brought senior executives together to discuss “effectiveness and
innovation in Corporate Giving.” those present recognized that giving pro-
grams could be deployed as part of the response to anti-business, anti-growth
sentiment if they were willing to take on more controversial projects. Several
speakers noted with frustration that involvement in good works related to their
company’s core business were criticized as self-serving, while commitments to
worthy but unrelated projects were dismissed as token. Unwilling to accept “the
indictment that we disregard the health, welfare, and life-style improvement
needs of our fellow citizens,” corporations sought “contribution concepts” that
would earn the “public recognition we believe we deserve.”62 participants
described initiatives that aimed to limit pollution, improve conservation, tackle
drug rehabilitation, and respond to a wide range of special interest groups,
including the special needs of seniors, disabled Canadians, and students.
Overall, there was a shift away from “bricks and mortar” toward “people-ori-
ented” projects that would relieve distress and enrich the quality of life, in part
due to increases in government contributions in education and health care.
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60 “Business recognizes its social role,” The Canadian Banker 79, no. 4 (July/August 1972): 15. 
61 ibid. 
62 Donald Carlson, Vice-president, Ford Motor Company of Canada, in Effectiveness and
Innovation in Corporate Giving. Proceedings of the Working Conference on Company
Contributions, Held on Toronto, September 30 and October 1, 1971 (Ottawa: Conference
Board of Canada, 1972), 22. 
As Robert Hurlbut, president of General Foods, Canada, explained,
“Meaningful corporate giving is a legitimate method of demonstrating to the
public and the government that we are effective successful business organiza-
tions, that we have a social conscience, and are aware of our responsibility to
help.”63 “What do we want to get in return for our donation?’ asked the repre-
sentative from Shell Canada. “the answer,” he concluded, “is ‘recognition’ for,
without recognition; there is no opportunity to influence. Our discovery was that
we wanted to influence public opinion, and from that discovery there flowed
backwards consideration of the ways and means by which our donations might
be used, not only to support meritorious causes but to influence opinion.”64
there was a shared vision, but not unanimity. Speakers were concerned
about social unrest, urban decay, rapid change, drop-outs and alienation, but
there were also numerous references to the conservative American economist
Milton Freidman, who had recently argued that “the business of business was
business” and not social programs. Corporations, Freidman objected, and many
agreed, were becoming involved in areas where they had little expertise and
which should in any case be left to government or private individuals. the
response of most Canadian corporations, however, was not to stop giving, but
to give more strategically, justifying decisions in terms of business benefits.65
the first large-scale academic study of corporate giving appeared at this
time, and expanded rapidly into an investigation of the full field of what was
becoming known as the not-for-profit sector.66 Samuel Martin, a business pro-
fessor at the University of Western Ontario, developed a “humanistic matrix”
of inputs (funds) and outputs (causes) to examine the growing number of insti-
tutions united by the common objective of bettering society through the
offering of health, education, welfare, or cultural services. the presence of an
activist state, which delivered some of its services by funding private organiza-
tions, had helped to grow, rather than shrink, the field of philanthropic
endeavor. By 1969, over 22 percent of Canada’s Gross national product 
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64 Warren Birt, Manager-personnel, Shell Canada, ibid., 36–7. 
65 in 1967, most of the companies interviewed by the Conference Board of Canada reported no
change in their giving policies. By 1971, 29 of 174 companies reported that they had altered their
policies within the previous two years, and 38 others indicated they planned to alter their poli-
cies within the next year. Many indicated their intentions to shift their contributions from capital
funds drives to new and “non-traditional” alternatives. Richard Hopkinson, Company
Contributions in Canada, 1967 (Montréal: national industrial Conference Board, 1969);
William terry, Company Contributions, 1971 (Ottawa: the Conference Board in Canada, 1972). 
66 Martin insisted that corporate giving could only be understood in reference to the roles and
responsibilities of federal, provincial, municipal governments and individual Canadians. Half
of the funds for his study were provided by John Labatt Ltd. Additional major donors included
the Ford Motor Company of Canada, the Steel Company of Canada, and the Corporate
Associates of the School of Business Administration of the University of Western Ontario.
Martin, Financing Humanistic Service, 10. 
tHe inCORpORAtiOn OF pHiLAntHROpy: neGOtiAtinG tenSiOnS
BetWeen CApitALiSM AnD ALtRUiSM in tWentietH CentURy CAnADA
was devoted to the provision of what Martin referred to as the “humanistic” 
services. this sector was for the most part organized on the corporate model:
funded by government, by donations from business and individuals, from user
fees and services charges; employing thousands of paid workers; business-like
in the organization of its services, but not-profit distributing. 
Martin’s study revealed that corporate donations constituted less than twenty
percent of the total funding of this sector, but assumed a greater importance than
either absolute or relative size would indicate.67 Corporate donations had a dis-
proportionate impact because they were larger and generally more visible than
the mean individual donation. they also tended to be concentrated, directed
towards the largest, organized causes. the ability to secure corporate funding was
seen as akin to an endorsement and was seen to carry the prestige and assistance
not only of the corporation itself, but also of some of its most respected leaders.68
Canada’s largest corporations sought to increase the visibility of their social
performance. Donations in the larger companies were determined by committee
or by one or more dedicated professionals, often attached to the public relations
division. Although business donations continued to be “results oriented,” the
horizons of giving continued to expand. As Suncor explained in its 1981 Annual
Report, the company’s growing commitment to social responsiblity meant that
it would continue to “do what an oil company usually does in the course of its
business but with sensitivity to the impact on others” and it would seek to “iden-
tify, investigate and attempt to meet social needs which may be unrelated to
company operations but reflect the responsibilities of corporate citizenship.”69
Meeting the first objective involved the preparation of environmental impact
studies, the prevention and cleaning up of oil spills, and efforts to restore land
and conserve water at Suncor sites. the second objective involved the com-
pany’s philanthropic efforts, which ranged from financing a documentary to
increase awareness of the challenges faced by disabled persons to support for
regional science fairs. Going forward, Suncor proposed to concentrate on the
special problems of the elderly, effective coaching for young athletes, and sup-
port for cultural organizations. Suncor’s statement was presented in a Canadian
business text as a model of businesses’ systematic approach to social issues. 
Since the 1960s, Canadian business had sought to answer its critics in the
context of a generally strong economy. this changed in the 1980s as inflation
rose and competition increased on a global scale. Mid-decade efforts to tame
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67 ibid., 70. 
68 Martin, Financing Humanistic Service, 70. 
69 Suncor Annual Report, 1981, 48–9, reproduced in Robert Sexty, Issues in Canadian Business,
2nd ed. (Scarborough: prentice-Hall, 1983), 431. Large corporations were developing broad
policies acknowledging their responsiblity to society; but even companies operating on a
smaller scale were also advised that contributions had become an important part of modern
business life and should be approached systematically. See “How to form your company’s con-
tributions policy,” Canadian Business (August 1973): 48–50. 
inflation resulted in significant tax increases. Challenged to become “lean and
mean,” businesses cut back, job losses mounted, and corporate donations
declined. Companies sought to mitigate the erosion of financial contributions
with gifts-in-kind and by encouraging employees and pensioners to take an
active role as volunteers (described by some as the “outsourcing of philan-
thropy”). Although the amount of corporate giving had risen steadily in dollar
terms, giving as a percentage of pretax profits had begun to erode.70
the 1980s were also a time when two seemingly inconsistent developments
began to reshape corporate giving. the first trend was the emergence of cause-
or event-related marketing programs that sought to link corporate fund-raising
for the benefit of worthy causes directly with the purchase of the firm’s products
or services. While corporate sponsorship of special events was not new, these
programs were explicitly designed to increase sales and enhance brand image by
forging a close working relationship between company and cause. 
in many cases, the initiative for these programs came not from the corporate
philanthropy budget, but from the marketing, promotions, or advertising divi-
sions. these programs were vulnerable to critics who accused businesses of
choosing causes according to their marketing potential. Detractors noted that
spending on the advertising of good deeds tended to equal or exceed expenditures
on the social welfare aspect of these projects and were, furthermore, tax
deductible: the marketing programs of corporate Canada were being subsidized
by taxpayers. Some suggested that voluntary organizations were altering their
program objectives to attract funding. Concerns were also raised that the con-
sumers of goods and services marketed in conjunction with good causes might
come to believe that they had discharged their philanthropic responsibilities, even
though the contributions going to the core project was often quite minimal.71
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70 in the postwar decade, the recording of tax deductions makes it possible to chart the steady rise in
corporate donations. in aggregate numbers, donations rose from $1 million in 1946 to $368 mil-
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Essential Grace: Funding Canada’s Health Care, Education, Welfare, Religion and Culture
(toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 226-7, 231. Victor Murray and phelps Bell, “Making
Corporate Donations Decisions,” The Philanthropist 9, no. 1 (1990): 47, 62.
71 excellent overviews of this form of philanthropy are Samantha king, “An All-Consuming
Cause: Breast Cancer, Corporate philanthropy and the Market For Generosity,” Social Text 69
19, no. 4 (Winter 2001); p. Varadarajan and A. Menon, “Cause-Related Marketing: A Co-align-
ment of Marketing Strategy and Corporate philanthropy,” Journal of Marketing 52, no. 3 (July
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petro-Canada’s involvement in the 1988 Winter Olympics offers an inter-
esting case in point. the company organized and sponsored an 18,000
kilometre, 88-day Olympic torch Relay, which saw some 7,000 torch bearers
carrying the Olympic flame through every province and territory on the way to
the Calgary Winter Olympics. the event marked a turning point in the accep-
tance of the petro-Canada brand. the relay was integrated with a
commemorative glassware promotion, and an extensive print and broadcast
campaign inviting Canadians to “Share the Flame” by dropping off applications
to carry the torch at petro-Canada stations. More than 50 million torch Relay
glasses were sold through petro-Canada retail sites. the proceeds from the
glassware campaign were used to establish the petro-Canada Olympic torch
Scholarship Fund. Since that time, over $6 million in scholarships have been
awarded to more than 2,000 non-carded athletes and coaches, making this pro-
gram one of the largest sources of such private funding in Canada. the Olympic
216
JOURnAL OF tHe CHA 2009 ReVUe De LA S.H.C.
Doing Good by Looking Good
In 1988, Petro-Canada sponsored the Olympic Torch Relay, subsequently using the pro-
ceeds of Torch Relay glasses to create a scholarship fund. The success of the program
boosted Petro-Canada’s popularity with the Canadian public, strategically leveraging
its giving for the mutual benefit of the both cause and bottom line. Illustration used with
the permission of Whitecap Publishing.
flame run was so popular that the oil company was reported to be earning $1.15
million a month in additional after-tax profit, and had secured, at least tem-
porarily, an additional two percent share of Canada’s retail gasoline market.72
A well-chosen program, like petro-Canada’s sponsorship of the torch run,
offered an opportunity in partnership that could act as an expression of a col-
lective “personal” identity able to distinguish a business from its competitors
for the benefit of employees as well as the public.73 the potential for profit was
linked to the visibility of the philanthropic relationship: consumers must buy
the product to build sales and acknowledge the sponsorship to build good will.
the logic of investment became explicit and the ability of donations to con-
tribute to company profits acknowledged outright. As the Continental Bank of
Canada noted in its 1984 Annual Report, “Applying the same discipline to the
management of the corporate gift that is applied to other forms of spending is
now producing a measurable benefit to the donor as well as the recipient.”74
the strategic benefits of this form of philanthropy were captured in the com-
monly used phrase “doing well by doing good.” performing philanthropy had
become a way of being entrepreneurial.75
the first response to intense economic pressures was to position giving as
a profit-seeking strategy. the second response was to segregate the donations
programs through the creation of charitable foundations. Although charitable
donations had long been tax deductible, companies did not, for the most part,
regard the tax benefit as a significant motivator. However, as taxes rose and
business became increasingly competitive, the opportunity to manage giving to
minimize the tax burden and reduce pressure on annual earnings became
increasingly attractive. establishing a foundation created a strong public pres-
ence, allowing companies to demonstrate their support for social causes and
end lingering suspicions that donations programs were largely managerial
perks. they offered charities more stable funding in the face of government cut-
backs and provided the opportunity for companies to build long-term
philanthropic agendas. Cause-related programs and foundations were seen as
useful tools by companies facing declining customer loyalty, loss of brand
domination and a significant image problem in a difficult economy. 
A final step marking the integration of philanthropy was a 1988 initiative
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Philanthropist 18, no. 3 (2004). 
74 Allan Arlett, “Corporate Giving: Why non-profits Are Vulnerable,” The Philanthropist 8, no.
4 (1989): 8. 
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Destinations
The largest recipient of corporate giving continues to be health and welfare, despite the
expansion in government commitments to this sector. While donations to education rose,
corporations no longer give statistically significant amounts to religious organizations.
Source: Data for 1951, Albert Shea ed., Corporate Giving in Canada (Toronto: Clarke,
Irwin & Co, 1953), 56. Data for 1989 Ontario Law Reform Commission, “Supervision
of Charities by Revenue Canada: A Brief History” in Report on the Law of Charities,
Vol. 1, 1996, 121.
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of the Canadian Centre for philanthropy designed to formalize corporate giving
standards. the iMAGine program was devised by the centre (which was itself
registered as a charity in 1981 to promote charitable giving) with the aim of
persuading every corporation in Canada to adopt a policy of giving one percent
of pre-tax profits, and to encourage employee donations through payroll deduc-
tions, organized voluntarism and matching donations.76 Allan Arlett, the
president and Chief executive Officer of the centre, explained that the one per-
cent figure (to be based on the average of the three preceding years, excluding
non-recurring items and foreign operations) was chosen as an “attainable tar-
get,” already met by one out of every seven of Canada’s larger corporations in
1986. the challenge was to make this target normative. 
From a business perspective, the iMAGine program offered a number of
advantages. At the most basic level, a set goal could help to stabilize contribu-
tions in the face of escalating demand. More usefully, the program would grant
corporations meeting the one percent standard the right to use the phrase “a car-
ing company,” a registered designation of the iMAGine program. Recognition
from an independent agency, much like strategic philanthropy, was a relatively
inexpensive and socially acceptable form of advertising. the rituals of recog-
nition, including the presentation of various awards and certificates at an annual
banquet, would demonstrate to public that business was performing its social
responsibilities. 
the program, Arlett explained, would give credit to “those who deserve it,
and a message to the undeserving that they are increasingly out-of-step in not
contributing their fair share.”77 in the course of a century, the distinction
between the deserving and undeserving had migrated from individuals in need
of charity, to organizations distributing charity, to the corporations deemed able
to provide the funds. 
Conclusions: Paradoxes of Corporate Philanthropy 
the development of corporate giving presents a series of paradoxes.
philanthropy promises to transcend the limits of political and social inequity, to
relieve pain, and promote democracy. in practice, however, philanthropy repro-
duces and helps to stabilize hierarchies of economic power on both an
individual and an organizational basis. Corporate gifts can be perceived as evi-
dence of social responsibility; however, generations of business leaders
acknowledge the difficulty in measuring the results of investments in benevo-
lence. the voluntary nature of corporate philanthropy evokes the ideal of
76 Arlett, 15–6. 
77 A 1986 Decima research poll showed that eight out of ten Canadians believed corporations had
a responsiblity to provide financial support to charities and non-profit organizations, with half
of this group viewing it as a “major” corporate responsiblity. Arlett, 7.
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community; however, the decision to give or withhold funds ultimately remains
with the corporation, enhancing the power of business. 
Corporate philanthropy is not an alternative to capitalism, but an aspect of
the same organized structure of economic domination. the discourses of mod-
ern philanthropy reflect the values of corporate capitalism, privileging
efficiency, accountability and organization, as well as competition and market
share. the reconstruction of philanthropy and the emergence of a non-profit
sector parallel changes in the organization of corporate capital and duplicate
donor commitments to economy of corporate capitalism. 
it is perhaps most useful to understand corporate philanthropy not as a gift
or act of charity, but as the visible complement to Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand.” it was not, Smith observed, the benevolence of the butcher that put din-
ner on the table, but the unplanned and unintended consequences of
self-interest, organizing markets for the social good. in the practice of corpo-
rate philanthropy, the increasingly public performance of morality differently
blurs the line between interest and disinterest so that it is in the interest of cor-
porate donors to appear disinterested. in practice, the corporation strives to
project the absence of self-interest; but in imagining the common good, the cor-
poration sees its reflection and donates accordingly. 
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* * *
BETTInA LIvERAnT recently completed her doctorate at the University of
Alberta. Her dissertation, titled “Buying Happiness,” examined the role played
by the intellectual community in formulating a new understanding of Canada
as a society of consumers. While preparing her dissertation for publication, she
has begun a new project examining the development of corporate philanthropy
in modern Canada. 
BETTInA LIvERAnT a récemment obtenu son doctorat de l’Université de
l’Alberta. Sa thèse, intitulée « Buying Happiness », porte sur le rôle joué par
l’intelligentsia dans la conception d’une nouvelle vision du Canada à titre de
société de consommation. en attendant d’avoir fini de préparer la publication
de sa thèse, elle s’est lancée dans un nouveau projet qui s’intéresse à l’essor du
mécénat d’entreprise dans le Canada moderne. 
